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I. INTRODUCTION
In July 2012, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights issued a
landmark decision in Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v.
Ecuador, 1 an indigenous rights case that had been on the Inter1. Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Merits and
Reparations, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245 (June 27, 2002),
available
at
http://corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_245_ing.pdf
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American system’s docket for over eight years. 2 The Inter-American
Court held that the state of Ecuador had violated both international
and domestic law by allowing an Argentine oil company to drill on
indigenous land without first consulting the resident Kichwa
community. 3 Citing various sources of law, including the American
Convention on Human Rights (“ACHR”), 4 the Indigenous and Tribal
Peoples Convention (“ILO Convention 169”), 5 and the Ecuadorian
Constitution, the Court found Ecuador in breach of the Kichwa’s
right to give or withhold their free, prior, and informed consent
(“FPIC”) on all decisions potentially affecting their property or
rights.
Sarayaku represents a major victory for indigenous peoples
throughout the Americas and perhaps the world. The decision sets a
stricter standard than any preceding Inter-American decision or legal
instrument on the rights to consultation and FPIC in the context of
state-sponsored development. Brazil embodies a prime example of a
state under the Court’s jurisdiction that likely is affected by the
Sarayaku decision. 6 In violation of its indigenous peoples’ rights,
Brazil approved the development of Belo Monte, a major
hydroelectric complex whose construction currently is underway. 7
[hereinafter Sarayaku].
2. See id. ¶ 1 (noting that the Association of the Kichwa People of Sarayaku
and others filed the petition before the Commission on Dec. 19, 2003).
3. See id. ¶ 341, § 1–4 (finding that Ecuador’s acts and omissions surrounding
the Sarayaku Kichwa amounted to a violation of the indigenous people’s rights to
consultation, communal property, and cultural identity).
4. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights,
Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter ACHR].
5. International Labour Organisation, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples
Convention (No. 169) art. 16, June 27, 1989, 72 ILO Official Bull. 55 [hereinafter
ILO Convention 169].
6. Although the Inter-American system does not possess a formal rule of stare
decisis, the Commission and the Court regularly refer to past holdings to inform
their applications of the ACHR and determine whether an OAS state has violated
substantive provisions. See, e.g., Saramaka People v. Suriname, Preliminary
Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Cost, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 174, ¶
63 (Nov. 28, 2007) [hereinafter Saramaka] (relying on the Court’s evidentiary
analyses in Awas Tingni and five other cases to assess the documentary evidence in
the case at hand and thereby assess Suriname’s liability).
7. Elzio Barreto & Carolina Marcondes, Brazil OKs Building of $17 bln
Amazon
Power Dam, REUTERS, Jan. 26, 2011, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/26/brazil-energy-amazonidAFN2613167320110126.
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This comment argues that the new FPIC standard set by Sarayaku
has the potential to delegitimize Belo Monte’s development, which
Brazil authorized without first properly consulting the indigenous
groups whose lands and livelihoods it will adversely affect. Part II
provides a history of the dam and describes its projected impacts on
local indigenous peoples. It then presents the legal underpinnings of
Brazil’s consultation and FPIC obligations, as provided by the
ACHR, Brazilian law, and ILO Convention 169. Part II concludes by
discussing how Sarayaku further expands the consultation and FPIC
protections established by prior Inter-American case law.
Part III draws parallels between Sarayaku and the Belo Monte
dispute to demonstrate the applicability of the Sarayaku standard to
the latter. To achieve this, Part III analyzes Brazil’s acts and
omissions surrounding Belo Monte to illustrate that the state is in
breach of the same legal instruments and FPIC standards that the
Court found Ecuador had violated in Sarayaku.
Part IV offers recommendations on how Brazil should proceed
with Belo Monte’s development in light of Sarayaku. Part IV
concludes by attempting to fill the gap in the existing international
indigenous rights law by suggesting that ILO Convention 169 revise
its text to reflect the Sarayaku standard.

II. BACKGROUND
A. THE BELO MONTE HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT
1. The Development of the Controversial Dam
For over thirty years, the Xingu Basin of the Brazilian Amazon
has been the site of an ongoing development dispute that has drawn
intense reactions from the Brazilian public and the international
community alike. Under the original 1970s plan, what was then
known as the Altamira Complex would have consisted of six
separate dams and five generating plants. 8 The highly controversial
8. See Jacquelyn Amour Jampolsky, Comment, Activism Is the New Black!
Demonstrating the Benefits of International Celebrity Activism Through James
Cameron's Campaign Against the Belo Monte Dam, 23 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y 227, 243 (2012) (stating that the complex would have consisted of two dams
whose sustained operation would have required the building of four additional
dams).
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proposal required flooding of over 20,000 square kilometers of land,
including the entire Paquigamba indigenous reserve. 9 In response to
severe criticism from the international community and violent dissent
from indigenous groups—which led even the World Bank, the
project’s principal funder, to withdraw its backing—the government
modified its proposal.10 By 1998, the renamed “Belo Monte”
complex had undergone a drastic makeover. The new design called
for a single dam capable of producing eleven gigawatts of electricity
and for the inundation of 500 square kilometers of land, 11 a third of
the area that would have been flooded under the original scheme. 12
While smaller than the Altamira Complex, Belo Monte will still be
the world’s third largest dam and is expected to cost R$20 billion to
develop. 13
Despite its reduced scale, Belo Monte’s development still
threatens to wreak havoc on the ecological and social landscape of
the Xingu Basin. 14 Nevertheless, Brazil continues to defend the
project, claiming that it will create thousands of new jobs and is
critical to meeting the country’s growing energy needs. 15 Sitting
9. See id. (observing that the complex’s construction and operation would
have either displaced or directly affected twelve indigenous groups). But see Cases
Examined by the Special Rapporteur (June 2009 – July 2010), U.N. Doc,
A/HRC/15/37/Add.1, 32 (Sept. 15, 2010) (by James Anaya) [hereinafter Anaya
2010 Report] (reporting that the Brazilian state claimed only 1500 square
kilometers of land would have been flooded under the original scheme).
10. See Anthony L. Hall & Sue Branford, Development, Dams and Dilma: The
Saga of Belo Monte, 38 CRIT. SOCIOL. 851, 852 (2012) (describing the “First
Encounter of the Indigenous Nations of the Xingu” of 1989, a massive
confrontation between indigenous protestors and developers that drew international
attention to the dam and its destructive potential); Jampolsky, supra note 8, at 243
(describing the collaborative social movement that led to the World Bank’s
withdrawal from the project).
11. See Tom Phillips, Brazil to Build Controversial Belo Monte Hydroelectric
Dam
in
Amazon
Rainforest,
GUARDIAN,
Feb.
2,
2010,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/feb/02/brazil-amazon-rainforesthydroelectric-dam (noting that energy production is expected to start in 2015).
12. Anaya 2010 Report, supra note 9, at 32.
13. See Phillips, supra note 11 (reporting the Brazilian environmental
ministry’s claims that the consortium awarded the Belo Monte project will have to
spend an additional $800 million to offset the project’s environmental damage).
14. See infra Part II.A.2 (identifying the projected social and ecological
impacts of Belo Monte on the Xingu Basin).
15. See Ministry of Mines and Energy, BELO MONTE HYDROELECTRIC DAM
PROJECT: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 6, 10 (2011), available at
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President Rousseff, who inherited Belo Monte from the Lula
administration, has championed the dam as the cornerstone of her
plans to expand Brazil’s energy infrastructure and harvest the
Amazon’s hydropower potential. 16 The state has also promoted Belo
Monte as a model of “green” energy that will allegedly help Brazil
comply with its international environmental obligations. 17
The state’s firm backing of Belo Monte perhaps explains why the
project has flourished despite glaring omissions and illegalities
throughout its authorization and implementation processes. In fact,
Brazil permitted its National Congress to hold a legislative vote to
approve the dam without first consulting the numerous indigenous
groups affected by its development. 18 According to a court decision
that was later reversed, failure to consult the indigenous groups
directly violated domestic law and, as such, the decree authorizing
the dam is invalid and unenforceable. 19
Furthermore, the government’s issuance of a “partial installation

http://www.brasil.gov.br/para/press/files/faq-belo-monte-1 [hereinafter FAQS]
(claiming that Belo Monte will provide abundant low-cost energy and directly
create 19,000 jobs during the peak of its construction).
16. See Brazil Court Reverses Amazon Monte Belo Dam Suspension, BBC
NEWS, Mar. 3, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-12643261
[hereinafter Court Reverses] (“The government says the dam is crucial for
development and will create jobs, as well as provide electricity to 23 million
homes.”).
17. See Press Release, Int’l Rivers, Amazonian Communities Occupy the Belo
Monte Dam Site (June 15, 2012), available at http://www.internationalrivers.org/
resources/amazonian-communities-occupy-the-belo-monte-dam-site-7514
(discussing the government’s claims that the dam is a “source of ‘clean energy’ for
a ‘Green Economy,’” but also noting that the dam will produce “an enormous
amount of methane, a greenhouse gas 25–50 times more potent than carbon
dioxide”).
18. See Mariano Castillo, Judge Halts Construction on Brazil’s Belo Monte
Dam, CNN, Aug. 15, 2012, http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/15/world/americas/
brazil-belo-monte-dam/index.html (reporting a federal court’s decision to suspend
construction on the dam until affected indigenous communities “get a say on the
matter”).
19. See Brazilian Court Halts Belo Monte Hydroelectric Dam Project, BBC
NEWS, Aug. 14, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-19263675
[hereinafter Court Halts Belo Monte Project] (quoting Judge Souza Prudente as
holding that legislators can only give the “go-ahead” to projects affecting
indigenous rights if the communities concerned have provided their consent, and
therefore, without such consent, the legislation to approve the dam was “flawed”).
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license” was not authorized under Brazilian law. 20 The Brazilian
Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural Resources
(“IBAMA”), the Ministry of the Environment’s enforcement agency,
granted Norte Energia the partial license in 2011 even though the
consortium had not met twenty-nine environmental and social
conditions. 21 These conditions, which the law requires developers to
meet before construction, included regulations concerning health,
education, sanitation infrastructure, and the protection of indigenous
lands. 22
The official environmental impact assessment (“EIA”) and the
processes surrounding the distribution of its findings also have been
wrought with error and ineffectiveness. Eletrobras, a state-owned
utilities company belonging to the Norte Energia consortium, carried
out the study without involving the affected indigenous
communities. 23 Furthermore, despite allegations that the study
grossly understated the dam’s socio-environmental impacts, IBAMA
succumbed to political pressure and approved the faulty EIA in
February 2010. 24 The state then failed to ensure that the public could
adequately access the study to become properly informed about the
dam and its projected impacts; in fact, the highly technical 20,000page document became publicly available only two days before the
Brazil Institute of the Environment (“BIE”) held meetings with
affected communities. 25 BIE also hosted the meetings in urban areas
20. Press Release, Amazon Watch, Int’l Rivers, Regional Judge Overturns Ban
on Construction of Controversial Belo Monte Dam in the Brazilian Amazon (Mar.
5, 2011), available at http://amazonwatch.org/news/2011/0305-regional-judgeoverturns-ban-on-construction-of-controversial-belo-monte-dam
[hereinafter
Construction Ban Overturned].
21. See Brazil Judge Blocks Amazon Belo Monte Dam, BBC NEWS, Feb. 25,
2011,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-12586170
(describing
Judge Desterro’s decision to suspend construction until Brazil ensured all the
environmental and social conditions were met).
22. See Construction Ban Overturned, supra note 20 (reporting that a federal
court subsequently overturned Desterro’s holding).
23. See Press Release, Int’l Rivers, Belo Monte Dam Suspended by Brazilian
Appeals Court (Aug. 15, 2012), available at http://www.internationalrivers.org/
resources/belo-monte-dam-suspended-by-brazilian-appeals-court-7631 (explaining
that this omission led the Regional Federal Tribunal to block the dam’s
construction, a decision that was subsequently overturned).
24. See id. (stating that IBAMA had approved the EIA in spite of objections
from its own technical staff).
25. See Anaya 2010 Report, supra note 9, at 32 (explaining that it was thus
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difficult to access from the remote rural sites where most of the
affected indigenous groups reside. 26
The public meetings held by Brazil and Norte Energia thus far
have been highly contentious and ineffective. As such, they hardly
qualify as the “consultations” Brazil is legally bound to hold. 27
Participants have described the meetings as “unequal” and “totally
asymmetric,” noting Norte Energia’s persistent refusal to address
indigenous demands. 28 Rather than fostering a climate conducive to
collaboration, the company has fueled conflicts between different
indigenous groups and within communities.29
Moreover, the meetings’ participants have accused the company of
attempting to “buy [them] off cheaply,” by offering televisions,
boats, and other perks while refusing to address the various legallyrequired social and environmental conditions the company has yet to
fulfill. 30 Norte Energia evidently has even taken advantage of
language barriers between its representatives and participating
indigenous groups by allowing interpreters to misrepresent the

“impossible for [affected indigenous groups] to be fully acquainted with the very
complex and highly technical project”).
26. See id. (noting that the cost and difficulty of travel prevented some
indigenous groups from attending the meetings).
27. See infra Part II.B (describing the legal underpinnings of the rights to
consultation and to FPIC).
28. See Press Release, Amazon Watch, After 21 Days, Indigenous Occupation
of Belo Monte Dam Ends in Discord (July 12, 2012), available at
http://amazonwatch.org/news/2012/0712-after-21-days-indigenous-occupation-ofbelo-monte-dam-ends-in-discord [hereinafter After 21 Days] (quoting Biviany
Rojas, an attorney with the Brazilian organization Instituto Socioambiental, and
describing the meetings between the multibillion-dollar corporation and the
divided tribes of indigenous peoples).
29. See Belo Monte Agrava Desarticulação Indígena [Belo Monte Aggravates
Indigenous Disarticulation], INSTITUTO HUMANITAS UNISINOS (June 29, 2012),
http://www.ihu.unisinos.br/entrevistas/510983-barragem-agrava-desarticulacaoindigena-entrevista-especial-com-rodolfo-salm [hereinafter Belo Monte Agrava]
(reporting that Norte Energia has taken advantage of ancient tensions between the
Xikrin and the Kayapó to undermine collaboration between the groups in their
joint campaign against the dam).
30. See After 21 Days, supra note 28 (stating that while Norte Energia
repeatedly offered “trinkets” to the various participants, it refused to set a timetable
for meeting the socio-environmental conditions as required by law or address the
peoples’ key concerns regarding navigability around the dam, loss of livelihoods,
land demarcation, and education and health programs, among others).
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statements of attendees with distorted translations. 31 During talks in
July 2012, the Arara and Juruna communities in attendance became
so frustrated with the consortium’s refusal to cooperate that they
non-violently detained three of its employees on tribal lands in
protest. 32 Despite the communities’ repeated efforts to engage
developers in good faith dialogues, however, both Brazil and Norte
Energia continue to disregard indigenous interests.
At present, construction of Belo Monte is already more than ten
percent complete. Though the dam has survived numerous judicial
efforts to shut it down, legal battles and protests rage on,
spearheaded by everyone from local indigenous leaders to
international celebrities. 33 As this comment will assess, the
precedential value of Sarayaku may offer the Xingu Basin’s
indigenous peoples an effective path to recourse.
2. Projected Impacts of the Belo Monte Dam
Belo Monte’s operation will divert more than eighty percent of the
Xingu River’s flow. 34 The most apparent outcome of this will be the
inundation of over 500 square kilometers of land, an area three times
the size of Washington, D.C. 35 The Brazilian government estimates
that large-scale flooding will displace around 20,000 people from the
Xingu Basin, while NGOs place the number closer to 40,000–

31. See id. (explaining that the Xikrin only agreed to stop a twenty-one-day
occupation of the dam site after a series of “confusing and poorly translated”
sessions with Norte Energia representatives).
32. Press Release, Amazon Watch, Amidst Broken Promises, Indigenous
Authorities Detain Belo Monte Dam Engineers (July 25, 2011), available at
http://amazonwatch.org/news/2012/0725-amidst-broken-promises-indigenousauthorities-detain-belo-monte-dam-engineers [hereinafter Broken Promises]
(stating that the tribal leaders vowed to keep the engineers “under detention until
Norte Energia and government agencies have fully carried out promises to mitigate
and compensate adverse impacts of Belo Monte”).
33. See, e.g., Jampolsky, supra note 8, at 229–30 (describing the anti-Belo
Monte campaign launched by award-winning film director James Cameron).
34. See Bianca Jagger, The Belo Monte Dam: An Environmental Crime,
HUFFINGTON POST, June 21, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/biancajagger/the-belo-monte-dam-an-env_b_1614057.html (reporting that Brazil will
need to build as many as five additional dams upriver, directly flooding the
territories).
35. See Barreto & Marcondes, supra note 7 (stating that dam operations will
also partially desiccate a hundred-kilometer stretch of the Xingu River).

174

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[29:1

50,000. 36 Though the state insists that the project will not flood
indigenous land, 37 studies reveal that local populations nonetheless
face numerous calamities. 38
Foremost, sections of the Xingu Basin that will not be underwater
will be left in perpetual drought. Research reveals that Belo Monte’s
development will dry out the Big Bend, a sixty-two mile stretch of
river that serves both as an ecological hotspot and a sacred “cradle of
civilization” for the basin’s indigenous groups. 39 Experts claim the
destruction of the Xingu will constitute a huge spiritual loss for local
peoples, for the basin’s very name means “house of god” in native
languages. 40
In addition to the cultural implications, drought conditions will
greatly diminish floral and faunal populations, jeopardize water
access, and impede fluvial navigation. 41 Inhabitants of affected areas
will become geographically isolated and unable to travel to the
commercial centers, schools, and social service providers located in
urban areas. 42 The loss of access to local markets and medical
36. Compare Ministério de Minas e Energia et al., RELATÓRIO DE IMPACTO
AMBIENTAL: APROVEITAMENTO HIDRELÉTRICO BELO MONTE 85, 93 (2009)
[hereinafter RIMA] (projecting that the dam will displace approximately 16,000
people from the Altamira area and another 2,000 from rural locations), with Court
Reverses, supra note 16 (claiming that as many as 50,000 people will become
homeless).
37. See Sheena Rossiter, Brazil's New Dam Unleashes Flood of Anger and
Hope: World View, BLOOMBERG, June 17, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2011-06-17/brazil-s-new-dam-unleashes-flood-of-anger-and-hope-worldview.html (quoting Energy and Mining Minister Edison Lobao as declaring that
“[n]o indigenous person will have to leave where they are today”).
38. See, e.g., Belo Monte Facts: 10 Myths the Brazilian Government Wants
You to Believe About Belo Monte, AMAZON WATCH, http://amazonwatch.org/work/
belo-monte-facts (last visited July 26, 2013) [hereinafter 10 Myths] (identifying
decreased water quality, faunal habitat destruction, loss of biodiversity, and
increased incidence of water-borne diseases as some of the dam’s projected
impacts).
39. See Sara Diamond & Christian Poirier, Brazil's Native Peoples and the
Belo Monte Dam: A Case Study, 43 NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS 25, 26–27
(2010) (explaining that it will become impossible for local peoples to continue to
rely on the river as a channel for trade and a source of some fish species).
40. Id. at 27 (stating that the Xingu’s destruction will be “nothing less than a
cosmological catastrophe” for local peoples).
41. See 10 Myths, supra note 38.
42. See Diamond & Poirier, supra note 39, at 29 (claiming that dam developers
have also threatened to actively cut off the indigenous communities’ access to
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facilities will become particularly problematic given the dam’s
projected effects on public health and rural food security. 43
The Belo Monte Dam also threatens to substantially deplete the
Xingu Basin’s fish stock, impeding the communities’ enjoyment of
the river’s resources and ability to subsist. 44 One study estimates that
reduced water flow will result in the death of millions of fish along
the Big Bend, an outcome that apparently no measure will be able to
offset or mitigate. 45
Studies reveal that communities are already witnessing the adverse
effects of dam activities on local wildlife. In September 2012,
fishermen from the basin reported that the construction of a
cofferdam had reduced fisheries production by fifty percent. 46 Such
an outcome will have strong implications for upstream communities
like the Kayapó, whose dietary staples include migratory species. 47
Also at risk are ornamental fish, which groups like the Juruna collect
certain social services if they refuse to consent to the dam’s development).
43. See, e.g., Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Indigenous Communities of the Xingu
River Basin, Pará, Brazil, PM 382/10, Apr. 1, 2011 (precautionary measures), ¶ 32
(noting the massive influx of migrants and dam activities will lead to the spread of
communicable and water-borne diseases); see also RIMA, supra note 36, at 85
(affirming that the population boom will leave indigenous groups more exposed to
alcoholism, drugs, and prostitution).
44. MINISTERIO PÚBLICO FEDERAL, TRF-1, No. 0028944-98.2011.4.01.3900,
17.08.2011, 11 (Brazil), available at http://www.prpa.mpf.gov.br/news/2011/
BeloMonte_Remocao.pdf/view [hereinafter Juruna-Arara Action] (observing that
Belo Monte’s expected impacts on the Big Bend’s ecosystem is particularly
worrisome because certain species of fish, like Hypancistrus zebra, exist nowhere
else in the world).
45. Compare id. at 11 (pointing out that the official EIA for Belo Monte fails to
mention this particular “irreversible” impact), with RIMA, supra note 36, at 114–
16 (affirming only that certain species of fish will “suffer,” but failing to provide
specific estimates of the expected damage). The EIA even downplays the threat by
claiming that the species expected to flourish after the reservoir’s construction will
be of higher subsistence and economic value than those that will be wiped out. Id.
46. See Press Release, Int’l Rivers, Fishermen Paralyze Construction of the
Belo Monte Dam (Sept. 20, 2012), available at
http://www.internationalrivers.org/resources/fishermen-paralyze-construction-ofthe-belo-monte-dam-7680 (describing how fifty fishermen set up a protest camp on
the Xingu to prevent Belo Monte workers from accessing a cofferdam’s
construction site in response to the dam’s impact on ecologically sensitive fish
species).
47. See Diamond & Poirier, supra note 39, at 26–27 (attributing the expected
losses of aquatic fauna in part to the significant decline in the Big Bend’s water
table that is projected to occur).
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and sell to local markets and intermediaries as a primary means of
generating income. 48 Thus, both Belo Monte’s direct and indirect
impacts threaten local communities’ enjoyment and use of their lands
and resources.

B. THE RIGHT TO FREE, PRIOR, AND INFORMED CONSENT AND ITS
LEGAL UNDERPINNINGS
As this comment will discuss, Brazil’s endorsement of Belo Monte
constitutes a violation of the state’s consultation and FPIC duties
under both domestic and international law. A growing number of
international guidelines and legal instruments, both binding and nonbinding, recognize the right of indigenous people to be consulted on
policies and decisions affecting their rights and livelihoods. 49 The
right of indigenous peoples to FPIC, where afforded, is intrinsically
tied to this right to consultation. According to advanced indigenous
rights regimes, consultations should aim to secure affected peoples’
prior and informed consent, 50 which these peoples in turn may freely
choose to give or withhold. 51
48. See RIMA, supra note 36, at 114; see also Press Release, Int’l Rivers,
Independent Review Highlights the True Costs of Belo Monte Dam (Oct. 12,
2009), available at http://www.internationalrivers.org/resources/independentreview-highlights-the-true-costs-of-belo-monte-dam-3783
(identifying
the
commercially valuable zebra pleco and the sheep pacu fish as facing possible
extinction as a result of the dam).
49. See, e.g., U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res.
61/295, 61st Sess. Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295, art. 19 (Oct. 2, 2007)
[hereinafter UNDRIP] (“States shall consult with indigenous peoples in good faith
and through their own representative institutions . . . before adopting any
administrative or legislative measures that may affect them.”); ILO Convention
169, supra note 5, art. 6 (requiring states to carry out consultations “with the
objective of achieving agreement or consent to the proposed measures”); World
Bank, Operational Policy (OP) 4.10 on Indigenous Peoples, para. 1 (adopted in
May 2005, effective July 2005) (stating that the “Bank provides project financing
only where free, prior, and informed consultation results in broad community
support to the project by the affected Indigenous Peoples”).
50. See, e.g., ILO Convention 169, supra note 5, art. 6.
51. See generally Andrea Carmen, The Right to Free, Prior, and Informed
Consent: A Framework for Harmonious Relations and New Processes for Redress,
in REALIZING THE UN DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES:
TRIUMPH, HOPE, AND ACTION 120, 120 (Jackie Hartley ed., 2010) (claiming the
right of indigenous peoples to FPIC is crucial to their “ability to exert sovereignty
over their lands,” redress abuses of their rights, and “establish criteria for
negotiations with states on matters affecting them”).
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1. The American Convention on Human Rights: Article 21 and Its
Interpretive History
The right to consultation evolved from international law’s
recognition of indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination, 52
specifically with regard to their cultural use of ancestral lands. 53 The
American Convention on Human Rights, which both Brazil and
Ecuador have ratified, requires states to respect citizens’ right to
property. 54 While the ACHR does not expressly entitle indigenous
peoples to consultations, Article 21’s recognition that everyone is
afforded “the use and enjoyment of his property” has become a key
basis for the evolving right. 55 Four cases, The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas
Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, 56 Mary and Carrie Dann v. United
States, 57 Maya Indigenous Communities of Toledo District v.
Belize, 58 and Saramaka People v. Suriname, 59 have been particularly
52. See UNDRIP, supra note 49, art. 3 (defining the right to self-determination
as providing peoples the liberty to “freely determine their political status and freely
pursue their economic, social and cultural development”).
53. See James Anaya, Indigenous Peoples’ Participatory Rights in Relation to
Decisions About Natural Resource Extraction: The More Fundamental Issue of
What Rights Indigenous Peoples Have in Land and Resources, 22 ARIZ. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 7, 8–9 (2005) (noting that the importance of land and resources to the
survival of indigenous cultures is a “widely accepted tenet” of contemporary
indigenous rights advocacy); see also Jeremy Firestone et. al., Cultural Diversity,
Human Rights, and the Emergence of Indigenous Peoples in International and
Comparative Environmental Law, 20 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 219, 262 (2005)
(identifying an emerging “paradigmatic shift” with regard to the international
commununity’s increasing acknowledgment and some states’ willingness to allow
indigenous peoples’ active involvement in the management of natural resources
and the protection of their intellectual property rights).
54. See ACHR, supra note 4, art. 21 (declaring that no one shall be deprived of
his property without “just compensation, which would include only the reasons of
public utility or societal interest”).
55. See id.; Alex Page, Indigenous Peoples’ Free Prior and Informed Consent
in the Inter-American Human Rights System, 4 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 16,
16-17 (2004) (asserting that collective ownership and self-governance strongly
affect how indigenous peoples make decisions related to their property).
56. Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. C) No. 79 (2001), available at
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_79_ing.pdf [hereinafter Awas
Tingni].
57. Case 11.140, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 75/02, OEA/Ser.L/V/1I. 117,
doc.1 rev. 1 (2003), available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2002eng/USA.
11140.htm.
58. Case 12.053, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 40/04, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.122,
doc. 5 rev. 1 (2004), available at http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2004eng/Belize.
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instrumental to expanding the scope of the right to property as
applied to indigenous peoples, thereby contributing to the
development of the right to FPIC.
Decided in 2001, Awas Tingni was the first internationally binding
ruling to extend the right to property to indigenous land and
resources. 60 The Inter-American Court found Nicaragua had violated
Article 21 of the ACHR by granting logging concessions on lands
traditionally used and occupied by the Awas Tingni without first
obtaining the community’s consent. 61 The decision was a watershed
because it established the collective right of indigenous peoples to
traditional lands even in the absence of official state-issued titles. 62
Some indigenous rights advocates have lamented the fact that
Awas Tingni did not clarify the extent of indigenous peoples’ right to
property and thereby leaves significant gaps in protection. 63 Still,
others applaud the decision for holding that a state has an affirmative
duty to protect indigenous peoples from third-party infringements on
their land rights even when it is not directly responsible for the
interference. 64

12053eng.htm.
59. Saramaka, supra note 6.
60. See generally Awas Tingni, supra note 56 (holding that the Constitution of
Nicaragua and Article 21 of the ACHR protects the property rights of indigenous
community members “within the framework of communal property”).
61. See id. ¶¶ 142–55 (noting that while Nicaragua had already formally
recognized indigenous peoples’ property rights, it had yet to “materialize that
recognition” through a specific procedure to grant title deeds).
62. See Jennifer A. Amiott, Environment, Equality, and Indigenous Peoples’
Land Rights in the Inter-American Human Rights System: Mayagna (Sumo)
Indigenous Community of Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua, 32 ENVTL. L. 873, 889
(2002) (declaring that the decision also establishes that states can no longer turn to
their domestic laws to validate violations of indigenous peoples’ rights).
63. David C. Baluarte, Comment, Balancing Indigenous Rights and a State’s
Right to Develop in Latin America: The Inter-American Rights Regime and ILO
Convention 169, 4 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL'Y 9, 9 (2004) (pointing out that “at
no point did the Court rule on the legitimacy of [the] administrative process”
authorizing the concession at dispute, and thus “the Court's express denial of any
reparations beyond the order to demarcate the [Awas Tingni’s] lands leaves the
question of where the line is drawn between the indigenous right to land and the
State's right to develop”).
64. Awas Tingni, supra note 56, ¶ 164 (ordering Nicaragua to abstain from and
prevent any actions that might affect the “existence, value, use or enjoyment of the
[Awas Tingni’s] property,” including those carried out by third parties).
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Mary and Carrie Dann v. United States, 65 which arose from a land
dispute between the U.S. government and members of the Western
Shoshone Nation, expanded Awas Tingni’s precedent. 66 Dann
provided that any state decisions affecting indigenous land rights
must be based on the “fully informed and mutual consent on the part
of the indigenous community as a whole.” 67 Notably, Dann ruled that
international law requires states to adopt “special measures” to
ensure that nothing deprives indigenous peoples of their collective
right to property without their consent. 68
Maya Indigenous Communities expanded on Dann, holding that
the duty to consult with the purpose of securing consent is a
“fundamental” component of states’ duty to respect indigenous land
rights. 69 Belize’s obligation to recognize Maya land rights through
the delimitation, demarcation, and titling of traditional territory thus
required the state to consult the communities and develop a system
consistent with their customary land use practices. 70 However, while
reaffirming the notion of informed consent, Maya Indigenous
Communities declined to find “an independent basis for FPIC in
international law protecting rights to consultation and selfdetermination.” 71 As such, the decision left the rights of indigenous
peoples to consultation intrinsically tied to their property rights. 72
65. Case 11.140, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 75/02, OEA/Ser.L/V/1I.
117, doc.1 rev. 1 (2003).
66. See generally id. (adjudicating the Danns’ allegations that the US violated
their rights under the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man by
imposing use restrictions on Western Shoshone traditional lands).
67. Id. ¶ 165 (forbidding the exclusion of individual members of an indigenous
community from decision-making processes affecting their collective property
interests).
68. See id. ¶ 131 (requiring states to consult indigenous peoples on decisions
affecting their lands “under conditions of equality,” and providing “fair
compensation” when appropriate).
69. See generally Press Release, Government Reviews Report of the InterAmerican
Commission on Human Rights, (Jan. 19, 2004); Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. Preliminary
Report No. 96/03, Maya Indigenous Communities of the Toledo District, ¶ 154
(Oct. 24, 2003) (observing that traditional lands play a central role in the “physical,
cultural, and spiritual vitality” of indigenous peoples).
70. See id. ¶ 129 (explaining that Belize must fulfill this obligation “in full
collaboration” with the Maya people).
71. Page, supra note 55, at 19.
72. See id. at 16, 19 (arguing that neither indigenous land rights nor FPIC can
be properly understood without acknowledging the interrelationship between
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The Inter-American Court addressed this potential gap in
protection in its ruling for Saramaka v. Belize. 73 Saramaka noted that
while Article 21 allows state laws to subordinate property rights to
societal interests, such restrictions cannot deny an indigenous or
tribal group’s survival as a people. 74 The Court set specific
safeguards to ensure indigenous peoples’ effective participation in
decision-making processes affecting their property. For instance, the
Court defined states’ consultation duty to include the task of
disseminating information on the projected social and environmental
impacts of a proposed measure to all communities that may be
affected. 75 Also, for the first time, the Court specified that
consultations must be carried out “in good faith, be culturally
appropriate, and have the intent of reaching an agreement.” 76
Importantly, Saramaka also held that when large-scale development
may jeopardize the survival of a people, the state must not only
consult the people but also actually “obtain their free, prior and
informed consent.” 77
The four cases discussed not only contributed to the interpretative
history of Article 21’s right to property, but also laid the foundation
for the rights of indigenous peoples to consultation and to FPIC.
Sarayaku further extended the scope of protection for indigenous
peoples by presenting a stricter, more detailed FPIC standard for
Organization of American States (“OAS”) states to follow.

indigenous self-determination and communal property ownership).
73. See generally Saramaka, supra note 6 (finding that Suriname had violated
the tribal Saramaka people’s rights to property and judicial protection by granting
logging and mining concessions in their land without their consent).
74. See id. ¶¶ 127–28 (affirming that restrictions are only acceptable under the
“interest of society” exception if they are: “a) previously established by law; b)
necessary; c) proportional; and d) with the aim of achieving a legitimate objective
in a democratic society”).
75. See id. ¶ 133 (requiring a state to consult communities not only when it
needs to obtain their approval, but also during the early stages of the project). The
Court particularly observes the importance of early notice, which allows
communities to carry out internal discussions and provide feedback in a timely
manner. Id.
76. Id. (calling on states to maintain “constant” communication by means that
take into account the “Saramaka people’s traditional methods of decisionmaking”).
77. See id. ¶ 134 (noting the need to further analyze the difference between
“consultation” and “consent” in this context).
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2. Sarayaku v. Ecuador: Setting a Higher Standard for the Right to
FPIC
Sarayaku v. Ecuador first entered the Inter-American system’s
docket in 2003, when the plaintiff Kichwa community of Sarayaku
filed a petition before the Inter-American Commission for Human
Rights (“IACHR”). 78 According to the petition, Ecuador acted
unlawfully by allowing a private company to develop on Kichwa
lands without first consulting the resident community and obtaining
its free and informed consent. 79 Finding a legal and substantive basis
for the plaintiff’s complaint, the IACHR referred the case to the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights for adjudication. 80 In July
2012, eight years after the case first entered the Inter-American
system, the Court issued a landmark decision, finding Ecuador in
breach of both domestic and international human rights obligations. 81
The Court concluded that Ecuador had violated the Kichwa’s
FPIC rights by examining several sources of law: the American
Convention on Human Rights, the Ecuadorian Constitution, and ILO
Convention 169. Foremost, the Court held that Ecuador had breached
Article 21 of the ACHR by failing to consult the Kichwa on the
execution of a project directly affecting their territory. 82 The Court
noted that activities of the CGC, an Argentinian-based oil company,
infringed on the Kichwa’s right to use and enjoy their traditionally
occupied property in several ways. Not only did the company
physically occupy the territory without first obtaining the
community’s permission, 83 but the oil exploration also physically
78. See Kichwa Peoples of the Sarayaku Community v. Ecuador, Case 12.465,
Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 64/04 (2004) (admissibility findings).
79. See id. ¶ 2 (alleging violations of specific articles of the ACHR and
domestic law).
80. See generally Kichwa People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Case 12.465,
Application to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Apr. 26, 2010),
available at http://www.cidh.org/demandas/12.465%20Sarayaku%20Ecuador%
2026abr2010%20ENG.pdf.
81. See generally Sarayaku, supra note 1.
82. See id. ¶ 232 (holding that Ecuador was obligated under both international
and domestic law to take all measures necessary to ensure the Sarayaku people’s
participation in decision-making processes concerning measures that could affect
their property rights and way of life).
83. See id. ¶ 124 (explaining that Ecuador acknowledged that it had granted
CGC a contract for oil exploration on Sarayaku territory without first securing the
community’s consent).
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altered the land. For example, CGC planted dangerous explosives in
the ground, clear-cut nearly 200 kilometers of primary forest, and
destroyed sites of cultural and spiritual value to the Kichwa. 84
In addition to the ACHR, the Court considered Ecuador’s
violations of its own domestic laws. According to the Kichwa,
Ecuador entered into a partnership contract with CGC in 1996
“without respect for the regulatory, constitutional, and conventional
procedures set forth in domestic and international law.” 85
Significantly, the CGC did not launch the exploration phase of
seismic prospecting until 2002,86 at which point the 1998
Constitution and the protections it afforded to indigenous peoples
had already been in effect for four years. 87
Additionally, by the time CGC unlawfully entered Sarayaku land,
ILO Convention 169 had already entered into force in Ecuador and
codified international standards for the rights to FPIC and
consultation. Among these was the duty of party states to consult
indigenous peoples “whenever consideration is being given to
legislative or administrative measures which may affect them
directly.” 88 The commencement of seismic testing on indigenous
land therefore constituted a direct breach of Ecuador’s operative
84. See id. ¶ 248; see also Press Release, Center for Justice and International
Law, Inter-American Court Condemns Ecuador for Violating Rights of Indigenous
People of Sarayaku (July 25, 2012), available at http://cejil.org/en/comunicados/
inter-american-court-condemns-ecuador-violating-rights-indigenous-peoplesarayaku [hereinafter Court Condemns Ecuador] (reporting that CGC had
abandoned 1400 kilos of highly dangerous explosives in an area covering 16,000
hectares, including zones used for hunting, fishing, and other traditional activities).
85. See The Kichwa Peoples of the Sarayaku Community and its Members v.
Ecuador, Petition 167/03, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 64/04
(Admissibility), ¶ 22 (Oct. 13, 2004).
86. See id. ¶ 23 (explaining that the exploration phase of seismic testing was
actually set to commence in 1997, according to the original contract between
Ecuador and CGC).
87. See generally CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE ECUADOR
[ECUADOR CONSTITUTION] 2008, art. 84 (Ecuador) (affording indigenous peoples
the right to consultation on decisions affecting their property as well as their
cultural and economic rights). But see Isabela Figueroa, Indigenous Peoples Versus
Oil Companies: Constitutional Control Within Resistance, 4 SUR INT’L J. ON
HUM. RTS. 51, 54-55 (2006) (identifying the conflict the 1998 Ecuadorian
Constitution created by reserving the right to subsoil resources for the state even
though most oil fields in the Ecuadorian Amazon are found on indigenous lands).
88. ILO Convention 169, supra note 5, art. 6.
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obligation to respect the rights of the Kichwa to consultation,
participation in decision-making processes, and free and informed
consent prior to the initiation of activities affecting their rights.
An important outcome of Sarayaku was the Court’s elaboration on
what constituted adequate, good faith consultations under
international standards. Although the Court had concluded in
Saramaka that states had a duty to carry out consultations in good
faith “with the object of reaching an agreement,” it failed to elaborate
on what exactly constituted “good faith.” 89 In contrast, Sarayaku laid
out specific conditions for fulfilling the good-faith requirement and
thereby set a higher standard for states to meet when carrying out
consultations. Importantly, the Court held that “good faith”
necessitates an absence of any form of coercion, whether committed
by the state or by third parties acting with the state’s authorization or
acquiescence. 90
Applying this criterion, the Court found that CGC’s various
coercive measures amounted to a violation by Ecuador of its
domestic and international consultation and FPIC duties. These
measures included circumventing the political organization of the
Sarayaku community by contacting individual members directly;
paying community members to recruit others to support CGC’s
activities; and bribing individuals and groups with money, gifts, job
offers, and other perks. 91 While CGC had committed these acts
without the state’s direct assistance, the Court held that Ecuador’s
failure to carry out its own consultation procedures by default
“favored a climate of conflict, division and confrontation between
the indigenous communities of the area.” 92 The Court also noted that
the state’s provision of armed forces to CGC as a security measure
was not conducive to fostering a climate of trust and mutual
89. See Saramaka, supra note 6, ¶ 133 (ordering states to hold consultations “in
good faith, through culturally appropriate procedures and with the objective of
reaching an agreement”).
90. See Sarayaku, supra note 1, ¶ 186 (finding that states must treat the
consultation requirement as more than “mere formality” and thereby aim to
establish a “climate of mutual trust” when engaging in dialogues with indigenous
groups).
91. See id. ¶¶ 73–74 (stating that the CGC lawyer offered the Sarayaku
“US$60,000.00 for development projects and 500 jobs for the men of the
community”).
92. Id. ¶ 198.
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respect. 93
The Court’s holding in Sarayaku was also a watershed decision
because it marked the first opinion where the Court expressly
asserted that the duty of states to consult indigenous peoples with the
aim of obtaining FPIC is non-delegable. The Court observed that a
state could not avoid its consultation duty by bestowing it upon a
private or third party, particularly if that party is the same entity
seeking to develop the land in dispute.94 Applying this reasoning, the
Court found that Ecuador had violated international and domestic
law by seeking to endorse CGC’s bad-faith attempts at “socializing”
the Sarayaku people as adequate forms of consultation. The Court
emphasized the inappropriateness of Ecuador’s delegation of its
consultation duty to an agent possessing an obvious conflict of
interest, questioning the integrity of third party consultations. 95
By setting these new conditions for states to apply when
attempting to authorize development on indigenous land, Sarayaku v.
Ecuador expands the protective scope of the right to FPIC. Notably,
Sarayaku fills in several of the gaps in indigenous rights protection
left by the prior Inter-American case law discussed above as well as
in existing international legal instruments.
3. Brazilian Law: The 1988 Constitution and Brazil’s Internalization
of ILO Convention 169
As in the case of Ecuador, Brazil’s domestic consultation and
FPIC duties to indigenous peoples are grounded partly in the state’s
own constitution. In addition to articles affording citizens equal
protection, the right to life, the right to property, and other
fundamental protections, 96 several provisions deal specifically with
93. See id. ¶¶ 190–93 (describing how Ecuador provided National Police and
Ecuadorian Army forces to assist the CGC’s activities, thereby intimidating
members of the Sarayaku community opposed to the company’s presence on their
lands).
94. See id. ¶ 199 (noting that even a partial delegation is invalid, as it fails to
comply with the good faith requirement and discourages a climate of respect).
95. See id. ¶ 188 (observing that CGC utilized its so-called consultations with
the Kichwa as a one-sided, opportunistic attempt to negotiate its entry onto legally
protected land).
96. See, e.g., CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.][CONSTITUTION] art. 5 (Braz.)
[hereinafter BRAZILIAN CONSTITUTION] (stating that all persons residing in Brazil
are equal before the law and “ensured of inviolability of the right to life, to liberty,
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indigenous land. Article 231 of the 1988 Constitution expressly
prohibits removing indigenous peoples from traditional lands except
when epidemics or catastrophic events present imminent threats to
the populations, or in the interest of national sovereignty. 97
Importantly, both the catastrophic event and national sovereignty
exceptions authorize only the temporary removal of affected
populations. 98
According to one scholarly analysis, a situation that would
actually reflect a sovereignty interest is the removal of an indigenous
population during wartime as a means of facilitating the movement
of military troops in a region. 99
Additionally, Paragraph 3 of Article 231 states that hydric
resources existing on indigenous land may be exploited only with
legislative authorization and after affected communities have been
allowed to voice their opinions on the matter. 100 These hydric
resources include “energy potentials” such as the untapped
hydropower potential of rivers like the Xingu.
Furthermore, by becoming a party to ILO Convention 169, Brazil
internalized an internationally set standard for the right to
consultation into its own domestic legal framework. ILO Convention
169 was ratified by Brazil in 2002 and enacted via presidential
decree on April 19, 2004. 101 Although reservations to ILO
to equality, to security, and to property,” subject to certain conditions).
97. See id. art. 231 (“The removal of Indian groups from their lands is
forbidden, except ad referendum of the National Congress, in case of a catastrophe
or an epidemic which represents a risk to their population, or in the interest of the
sovereignty of the country, after decision by the National Congress, it being
guaranteed that, under any circumstances, the return shall be immediate as soon as
the risk ceases.”).
98. Juruna-Arara Action, supra note 44, at 17 (quoting constitutional scholar
dos Anjos Filho as asserting that it can be inferred from the constitutional text that
the emergency displacement of an indigenous people should always be temporary
and last the shortest possible amount of time).
99. See id. at 16 (arguing that in such an event, the national security interests of
Brazil would arguably outweigh any temporary inconveniences the state may
impose on the population by relocating it until the threat has passed).
100. BRAZILIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 96, art. 231 (“Hydric resources,
including energetic potentials, may only be exploited . . . after hearing the
communities involved, and the participation in the results of such mining shall be
ensured to them, as set forth by law.”).
101. See Decreto No. 5.051, Diário Oficial da União (Braz.) (Apr. 19, 2004)
(promulgating ILO Convention 169 in compliance with Legislative Decree No.
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conventions are not permitted, 102 Article 34 allows state parties to
determine the “nature and scope” of the measures necessary to give
effect to the convention “in a flexible manner” that accounts for the
specific conditions and circumstances of each country. 103 Despite the
availability of this clause, the language of both the legislative decree
adopting the convention and the enacting presidential decree
suggests conformity with the treaty’s original text. 104
Domestic case law has affirmed Brazil’s obligations under ILO
Convention 169. In the 2007 case of Joisael Alves v. General
Director of the Alcântara Launch Centre, 105 the court ordered an
aerospace base to refrain from affecting a quilombola community’s
ability to subsist on their traditionally occupied lands. 106 The court
reasoned that through its ratification of ILO Convention 169 and
passage of Legislative Decree N° 43/2000, Brazil had “confirmed the
intention to establish public policy to fight discrimination against the
traditional ways of life of the indigenous and tribal peoples.” 107
Joisael Alves was significant not only because it was the first
application of ILO Convention 169 in a Brazilian court, but also
143).
102. See How International Labour Standards Are Created, ILO,
http://www.ilo.org/global/standards/introduction-to-international-labour-standards/
international-labour-standards-creation/lang--en/index.htm
(observing
that
although reservations to ILO conventions are not permitted, most of the standards
set by the agreements “reflect the fact that countries have diverse cultural and
historical backgrounds, legal systems, and levels of economic development,” and,
according to the ILO, these standards have thus been formulated with enough
flexibility to be “translated into national law and practice with due consideration of
these differences”).
103. See ILO Convention 169, supra note 5, art. 34.
104. See Decreto Legislativo No. 143, art. 1, Senado Federal (Braz.) (June 20,
2002) (approving the text of the Convention and declaring that any acts to revise it
are subject to the National Congress for approval); Decreto No. 5.051, supra note
101 (implementing Legislative Decree No. 143).
105. Judgment no. 027/2007/Jcm/Jf/mA, Case no. 2006.37.00.005222-7 (Feb.
13, 2007).
106. See INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, APPLICATION OF
CONVENTION NO. 169 BY DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL COURTS IN LATIN
AMERICAN: A CASEBOOK 61 (2009), available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/
groups/public/---ed_norm/---normes/documents/publication/wcms_123946.pdf
(explaining that quilombolas are African descendants who, like indigenous
peoples, practice subsistence farming on traditional lands).
107. Id. (quoting Joisael Alves v. General Director of the Alcântara Launch
Centre).
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because it interpreted the convention’s ratification as affirming
Brazil’s constitutional duty to promote “the well being of all”
without discrimination. 108 Subsequent decisions have likewise cited
Brazil’s enactment of the Convention in granting indigenous groups
protection over cultural rights and ancestral lands. 109 Brazil’s
internalization of ILO Convention 169 via legislative decisions,
executive decrees, and supporting jurisprudence thus shows the
operative status of the Convention under Brazil’s domestic
framework. As such, a violation by Brazil of its indigenous peoples’
rights to consultation and FPIC constitutes a breach of both
international and state law.

III. ANALYSIS
Although the Inter-American system’s case law may establish
important legal precedents, the Court has refused to invoke its
jurisprudence “as a criterion to be universally applied.” 110 The Court
instead relies on case-by-case analyses, giving consideration to the
specific facts and circumstances at hand. 111
In Sarayaku, the Court cited to several binding legal instruments
in deciding that Ecuador had violated its consultation and FPIC
obligations to the Sarayaku Kichwa: Ecuador’s constitution, ILO
Convention 169, and the American Convention on Human Rights.
Applying the Inter-American system’s case-specific approach, this
analysis will look to parallel and, where applicable, the same
authorities to determine whether Brazil’s actions and omissions
surrounding Belo Monte similarly violate international and domestic
law.

108. Id. at 61 (referring to Article 3 of the Brazilian Constitution).
109. See, e.g., Press Release, Supremo Tribuno Federal (Federal Supreme
Court), STF Considera Nulos Títulos de Terra Localizados em Área Indígena no
Sul da Bahia (May 2, 2012), http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/cms/verNoticiaDetalhe.
asp?idConteudo=206458 (explaining that in deciding that the Pataxó Hã-Hã-Hãe
Indians were entitled to live on their ancestral territory undisturbed, Brazil’s
Supreme Court invoked ILO Convention 169).
110. El Amparo v. Venezuela, Reparations, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 28, ¶
34 (Sept. 14, 1996) (conceding, however, that prior case decisions may have some
precedential value).
111. See id. (comparing the fact pattern of El Amparo with those of the
Velásquez Rodríguez and Godínez Cruz cases).
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A. THE BELO MONTE DAM’S DEVELOPMENT VIOLATES THE
ACHR
Under both domestic and international law, Brazil must consult
indigenous peoples residing within its territory on all decisions
affecting their property and rights with the goal of obtaining their
free, prior, and informed consent. Rather than providing an
exhaustive overview of all of the environmental implications of Belo
Monte, Part II.B. addresses the dam’s implications for the Xingu
Basin’s indigenous inhabitants in relation to their traditional way of
life and subsistence needs. Drawing from the presented facts, this
section will assess how the Belo Monte’s development, like CGC’s
activities on Sarayaku land, breaches Article 21 of the ACHR. By
demonstrating that the dam jeopardizes the affected communities’
use and enjoyment of traditional lands, this section shows that these
groups are in fact entitled to the rights to consultation and FPIC.
Belo Monte’s projected impact on lands traditionally used and
occupied by several indigenous groups constitutes a violation of
Article 21 of the ACHR. 112 Brazil may be held accountable for
breaching its treaty obligations even though a private entity, rather
than the state, is responsible for carrying out the construction and
operation of the dam. 113 In Sarayaku, the Court held Ecuador
accountable for violations of the Kichwa’s land rights given the
state’s authorization of and acquiescence to CGC’s actions. 114
Likewise, Brazil’s endorsement of Belo Monte and involvement in
its implementation makes it liable for any injuries to property
stemming from the project.
The Court found Ecuador in breach of Article 21 for failing to
consult the Sarayaku Kichwa on the execution of a project directly

112. See ACHR, supra note 4, art. 21 (holding that every person has the right to
use and enjoy his or her property, but that the law may subordinate such use and
enjoyment to societal interests).
113. See, e.g., Sarayaku, supra note 1, ¶¶ 187–88 (implying that a state cannot
delegate its consultation and FPIC duties to third parties, and noting that even if
such delegation were acceptable, a state would still have the duty to supervise and
monitor the consultation process to ensure the third party’s compliance with
international consultation standards).
114. See, e.g., id. ¶ 134 (claiming Ecuador was “fully aware” that CGC was
preventing the Kichwa from moving freely within their own land, yet did nothing
to mitigate the problem).
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affecting their territory. 115 CGC’s extractive activities, which
received both passive and active support from the state, 116 infringed
on the people’s land rights in various ways. Not only did the
company enter Sarayaku territory without obtaining the community’s
consent, 117 but it also committed acts that directly harmed the
physical landscape. These included planting dangerous explosives in
the ground, clear-cutting vast stretches of primary forest, and
destroying sites of cultural and spiritual value to the Kichwa. 118
The Belo Monte Dam’s anticipated implications for the Xingu
communities’ traditional lands are comparable in terms of its effects
on local indigenous populations. On one hand, the Brazilian
government insists that the dam will not directly flood any
indigenous territories. 119 On the other hand, it has acknowledged the
likelihood of outcomes that will nonetheless affect the communities’
ability to maintain traditional lifestyles. 120 For instance, the dam’s
115. Sarayaku, supra note 1, ¶ 232 (ruling that Ecuador was obligated under
both international and domestic law to take all measures necessary to ensure the
Sarayaku people’s participation in decision-making processes concerning measures
that could affect their property rights and way of life).
116. Compare id. ¶ 134 (June 27, 2012) (presenting the Commission’s
conclusion that Ecuador had passively assisted CGC in obstructing the Kichwa’s
freedom of movement by doing nothing to remedy the situation; the state was well
aware that numerous obstructions were impeding the Sarayaku people’s ability to
move freely within their territory or to voluntarily leave it at will, including
soldiers blocking the community’s access to the river and placing explosives in
areas used for subsistence activities), with id. ¶¶ 190–93 (describing how the
Ecuadorian government actively assisted CGC by providing armed forces to
protect CGC’s personnel and facilities from Sarayaku opposition, and that
Ecuador’s provision of armed security to CGC was pursuant to a 2001 cooperation
agreement between the state and oil companies operating in the country providing
that the state would “guarantee the security of the oil facilities as well as of the
persons working there”).
117. Sarayaku, supra note 1, ¶ 124 (explaining that Ecuador itself acknowledged
that it had granted CGC a contract for oil exploration on Sarayaku territory without
securing the community’s consent).
118. See Court Condemns Ecuador, supra note 84 (reporting that trees and
plants sacred to the Sarayaku community were destroyed as a result of CGC’s
actions).
119. See FAQS, supra note 15, at 5 (claiming that Belo Monte’s operation will
not flood any of the ten indigenous communities located within the dam’s project
area). But see Anaya 2010 Report, supra note 9, at 31 (presenting a non-exhaustive
list of fifteen indigenous groups projected to be adversely affected by the dam).
120. See FAQS, supra note 15, at 5–6 (implying that the dam will be an
“interference” with the traditional fishing, hunting, and farming activities of local
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construction is expected to substantially reduce stream flow and
leave areas of the river in permanent drought. 121 Consequently, many
communities along the river will lose access to fluvial navigation and
become geographically isolated. 122 This in turn will prevent families
from accessing urban centers for needed social services as well as
areas used for hunting, fishing, and other subsistence activities. 123
Furthermore, the influx of migrants into the region will also
adversely affect the indigenous communities’ enjoyment of their
territories and natural resources. 124 The government concedes that the
projected population boom will place a strain on the environment as
existing populations are forced to compete with newcomers over fish
and other resources essential to their way of life. 125 Moreover,
indigenous groups, and indicating that the state proposes to offset these impacts by
implementing “social-environmental programs,” including those addressing
territorial security, basic sanitation, and economic sustainability).
121. RIMA, supra note 36, at 112–14.
122. See Press Release, Amazon Watch, Amazonian Indigenous Peoples Occupy
Belo Monte Dam Site (June 23, 2012), available at http://amazonwatch.org/news/
2012/0623-amazonian-indigenous-peoples-occupy-belo-monte-dam-site (reporting
complaints that Norte Energia has thus far failed to fulfill its promise to implement
a system that will facilitate the movement of boats near the cofferdams, whose
construction is currently impeding fluvial travel, and that according to indigenous
protestors, this persistent lack of access to navigable waterways will leave
communities isolated unless they open up access roads to their villages, which will
in turn expose their lands and resources to illegal loggers, squatter settlements,
land speculators, and cattle ranchers).
123. See id. (pointing out that the city of Altamira, which is accessible only by
river for many indigenous communities, serves as a market for goods and is the
main source of healthcare and other essential social services); see also Press
Release, International Rivers, Amazonian Indigenous Leaders Call for Suspension
of Construction License for Belo Monte Dam (July 9, 2012), available at
http://www.internationalrivers.org/resources/amazonian-indigenous-leaders-callfor-suspension-of-construction-license-for-belo-monte (explaining that loss of
river navigation will impede access to Altamira’s schools and medical facilities).
124. See Construction Ban Overturned, supra note 20 (arguing that the
commencement of construction may “provoke chaos in terms of social
infrastructure in the region of Altamira,” considering that approximately 100,000
people are expected to migrate to the area to seek employment at the dam).
125. See RIMA, supra note 36, at 114–16 (predicting that the dam’s
construction will result in changes in the types of fish species available in the
Xingu, and that because some of the species expected to flourish have high
economic value, the government believes that conflicts between existing fishing
communities and new, opportunistic fishermen may result); see also id. at 131–32
(observing the possibility that the Xingu Basin will experience increased gold
mining activity, particularly along stretches of the river where the stream flow will
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experts also claim that opportunistic settlers looking to exploit
indigenous territories for gold and other valuable commodities may
provoke violent land wars. 126 By exposing the Xingu’s indigenous
peoples to these very probable threats to their land rights, the
Brazilian government is in breach of its duties under the ACHR.
Moreover, the Court interprets Article 21 to protect not only land
claims, but also to protect indigenous peoples’ cultural viability,
including “the development and continuation of their worldview.” 127
In fact, the Court has stated that the right to restitution in cases of
expropriation is enforceable only so long as the indigenous group has
retained spiritual and material ties to the land at issue. In Sarayaku,
the Court found it important to consider the “profound cultural,
intangible and spiritual ties” of the Kichwa to their territory to fully
understand the damage Ecuador and CGC’s actions caused. 128
According to the Court, Ecuador compromised the Kichwa’s cultural
integrity by passively supporting CGC’s devastation of sacred sites
and interference with ritual activities.
Likewise, Brazil’s endorsement of Belo Monte threatens the
Xingu indigenous groups’ cultural and spiritual existence. Foremost,
the dam’s development and operation will interfere with the ability
of local peoples to subsist. As discussed, some of the projected
impacts include the decimation of local fish stocks, the inundation of
lands used for agriculture and other subsistence activities, and the
desiccation of large areas of the basin, including sites used for
hunting and gathering. 129 By preventing indigenous groups from
be substantially lower, and that the Ministry of Mines and Energy posits that this
may lead to tensions between the newcomers and existing indigenous groups, as
well as increased environmental pressure on indigenous land).
126. See, e.g., Christian Poirier, Belo Sun Mining Sets Sights on Golden
Opportunity in the Xingu, AMAZON WATCH (Oct. 5, 2012),
http://amazonwatch.org/news/2012/1005-belo-sun-mining-sets-sights-on-goldenopportunity-in-the-xingu (stating that Canadian corporation Belo Sun Mining is
among the international mining companies already formulating plans to mine gold
along the stretches of the Xingu that Belo Monte’s development will leave
desiccated; if permitted, “the Xingu would become a scavenger’s feast” because
these mining operations would further degrade water quality in the Xingu Basin
and contaminate local fish stocks, which damming activities already threaten to
substantially diminish).
127. Sarayaku, supra note 1, ¶ 146.
128. Id. ¶ 149 (noting the non-pecuniary costs of CGC’s conduct).
129. See supra Part II.A.2 (noting the dam’s impacts).
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performing their traditional subsistence practices, Belo Monte
infringes on their cultural and economic use of traditionally occupied
lands. This violates Article 21 of the ACHR, according to its
interpretative history as established by Awas Tingni and developed
by subsequent cases. 130
Furthermore, the region’s native peoples regard the Xingu as the
birthplace of civilization; its destruction would thus constitute a
“cosmological catastrophe” for local groups like the Arara and the
Juruna. 131 By supporting a project that poses an imminent threat to
both the Xingu communities’ physical and cultural enjoyment of
lands they traditionally occupy or use, Brazil, like Ecuador, has
violated Article 21.

B. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BELO MONTE DAM VIOLATES THE
FPIC STANDARD SET BY THE SARAYAKU DECISION
1. Belo Monte’s Development and Operation Violates Sarayaku’s
Proscription Against the Use of Coercion
Brazil’s acts and omissions surrounding Belo Monte’s
development breach Sarayaku’s proscription against coercion. The
Inter-American Court’s requirement that consultations be carried out
in “good faith” necessitates an absence of coercive measures by the
state or third parties acting with the state’s authorization or
acquiescence. 132 The Brazilian state’s passive tolerance of Norte
Energia’s deceptive and opportunistic tactics during so-called
negotiations thus violates this condition.

130. See supra Part II.B.1.
131. Diamond and Poirier, supra note 39, at 30; see also BELO MONTE:
MASSIVE DAM PROJECT STRIKES AT THE HEART OF THE AMAZON, INTERNATIONAL
RIVERS 2 (2012), available at http://www.internationalrivers.org/files/attachedfiles/Belo_Monte_FactSheet_May2012.pdf (quoting José Carlos Arara, an
indigenous Xingu resident, as telling former president Lula: “Our ancestors are
there inside this land, our blood is inside the land, and we have to pass on this land
with the story of our ancestors to our children. We don’t want to fight, but we are
ready to fight for our land if we are threatened. We want to live on our land in
peace with all that we have there”).
132. Sarayaku, supra note 1, ¶¶ 185–86 (invoking the language of Article 6 of
ILO Convention 169, which also requires that the consultations be carried out in
good faith with the goal of reaching an agreement or obtaining consent to the
proposed measures).
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Norte Energia’s coercive practices during its apparently
“asymmetric” talks with the Xingu Basin’s indigenous communities
are reminiscent of CGC’s interactions with the Sarayaku Kichwa. 133
For example, during a public audience Norte Energia held in July
2012, the company evidently took advantage of attendees who spoke
little Portuguese by allowing biased translations to distort their
messages to the company’s president. 134 In a similar manner, CGC
defrauded the Kichwa when it obtained signatures for a letter of
support to the company under false pretenses. 135
Furthermore, Belo Monte developers have apparently taken
advantage of old divisions between the indigenous groups of the
Xingu Basin to aggravate already existing tensions. 136 This, in turn,
has undermined the solidarity of the joint movement against the dam
and made it more difficult for involved parties to reach an
agreement. 137 Comparably, CGC deliberately fueled conflicts
between the Kichwa and neighboring indigenous groups, as well as
between Sarayaku families themselves, to further its development
agenda. For instance, in order to break the Kichwa’s social cohesion,
CGC circumvented the political organization of the community by
contacting individuals directly to offer them money bribes and other
perks in exchange for their support. 138 As Sarayaku affirmed, such
measures are inherently coercive and violate the good faith

133. After 21 Days, supra note 28 (stating that the talks were disillusioning and
unbalanced, according to the attendees).
134. Id. (explaining that the Xikrin came into contact with nationalist society for
the first time relatively recently, and consequently speak very little Portuguese.)
Apparently, the Xikrin only agreed to stop occupying the dam site after a series of
“confusing and poorly translated” sessions with Norte Energia’s president. The
influential Xikrin warriors’ withdrawal from the protest subsequently put an end to
the occupation. Id.
135. Sarayaku, supra note 1, ¶¶ 73, 194 (describing how CGC had members of
the Sarayaku communities sign a list to indicate interest in the company’s offer to
send a medical team to the villages free of cost. CGC evidently then
misrepresented the list as a letter of support indicating the communities’ consent to
CGC’s presence and oil exploration activities on the communities’ lands).
136. See Belo Monte Agrava, supra note 29 (quoting Belo Monte expert Rodolfo
Salm as claiming that dam developers are using a colonial-era tactic of pitting
“Indian against Indian” in order to undermine their solidarity).
137. See id. (describing the conflicting goals of the Xikrin and the Kayapo).
138. See Sarayaku, supra note 1, ¶ 74 (noting that the state of Ecuador has not
disputed these allegations of bribery).
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requirement of the consultation duty. 139
The fact that Norte Energia, as opposed to state officials, carried
out these coercive acts does not relieve Brazil of liability. Although
CGC had defrauded the Kichwa unilaterally without the direct
assistance of Ecuador, the Court in Sarayaku noted that the state’s
failure to carry out its own consultation procedures by default
favored a climate of “conflict, division and confrontation between
the indigenous communities of the area.” 140 Likewise, the Brazilian
government’s failure to host state-sponsored consultations
conforming to international FPIC standards denied the Xingu
communities a better alternative forum to Norte Energia’s
unbalanced, coercive negotiations.
2. Belo Monte’s Development and Operation Violates Sarayaku’s
Requirement of the Duty to Consult
The Brazilian government’s conspicuous absence from decisive
stages of the dialogues between Belo Monte developers and affected
communities constitutes a violation of the Sarayaku standard. The
Court’s holding in Sarayaku stressed the fact that the duty to consult
indigenous peoples belongs exclusively to the state. 141 A state
therefore cannot delegate the duty of planning and carrying out
adequate consultations to a third, non-state party, particularly if that
party is the same entity seeking to develop the land at dispute. In the
Court’s view, even a partial delegation is invalid, as it both fails to
comply with the good faith requirement and discourages a climate of
respect. 142
Ecuador conceded that CGC, as opposed to state representatives,
took measures to reach an “understanding” with the Kichwa. 143 This
process of socializing community members not only included the use
139. Id. ¶ 194 (stating that the actions taken in an attempt to legitimize oil
exploration activities “failed to respect the established structures of authority and
representation within and outside the communities”).
140. Id. ¶ 198 (observing that the evident disconnect between CGC’s public
meetings and “a clear determination to seek consensus” contributed to conflict).
141. Sarayaku, supra note 1, ¶ 199 (holding that the state had acted
“inappropriately” by trying to delegate this duty).
142. See id. (finding the state’s partial delegation to be a violation of the
people’s right to participation).
143. See id. ¶ 203 (stating that CGC attempted to directly negotiate with the
Kichwa using measures that did not respect the Kichwa’s political organization).
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of the coercive tactics mentioned above, but also was conducted
without state supervision. 144 Accordingly, the talks were not so much
a balanced, collaborative exchange as a one-sided attempt by a selfinterested company to haggle its way into entering legally protected
land. As such, the Court held that CGC’s actions did not amount to
the “appropriate and accessible consultation” required by law. 145
Brazil’s absence during crucial junctures of the talks between
Norte Energia and the Xingu communities likewise violates the
state’s consultation duties under Sarayaku. 146 The decision affords
indigenous peoples the rights to participation and consultation at all
stages of a project’s planning and implementation. Norte Energia’s
commercial stakes in the hydroelectric project, however, creates a
conflict of interest that undermines the affected communities’
exercise of these rights. As in the case of CGC and the Sarayaku
Kichwa, dialogues between Norte Energia representatives and the
Xingu indigenous groups have been unbalanced and highly
contentious. 147 In fact, during the July 2012 talks, the communities
became so dissatisfied with Norte Energia’s lack of cooperation that
they detained three of the company’s engineers on tribal lands. 148
Finally, Sarayaku holds that even when indigenous groups
independently reach agreements with third parties, the state must
play a supervisory role to ensure that the groups’ rights are being
respected. 149 The lack of state representatives at multiple meetings
144. See id. ¶ 189 (asserting that Ecuador therefore could not ensure that CGC
had respected the rights of the community).
145. Id. ¶ 203 (noting the obvious conflict of interest).
146. See After 21 Days, supra note 28 (explaining that FUNAI and IBAMA
were “conspicuously absent” from the series of talks between Norte Energia and
the affected communities held during the occupation of the dam site in July 2012,
despite both organizations being present that very month at Brasilia-based
discussions authorizing the final diversion of Xingu’s flow).
147. See id. (describing the asymmetric negotiating process and the views of
indigenous and non-indigenous opponents of the dam who had attended the public
dialogues which Norte Energia held in July 2012).
148. See Broken Promises, supra note 32 (explaining that the incident occurred
after a series of fruitless negotiations, during which Norte Energia proposed a
system that would allow indigenous vessels to navigate sections of the river that
the dam will dry out; however, the communities shot down the “ludicrous” plan,
attempting instead to address the various socio-environmental safeguards Norte
Energia has thus far failed to implement).
149. See Sarayaku, supra note 1, ¶ 167 (providing that the state must protect
indigenous peoples from infringements on their rights by monitoring and
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held between Norte Energia and the Xingu communities is thus
unacceptable under the Sarayaku standard.
3. Belo Monte’s Development and Operation Violates Sarayaku’s
Requirement that Consultations be Informed
Brazil’s failure to adequately educate the Xingu communities
about Belo Monte and its projected impact violates Sarayaku’s
information requirement for the right to FPIC. With regard to
development schemes, in order to be fully informed, indigenous
peoples must be aware of all of the potential risks associated with the
proposed project. As both Saramaka and Sarayaku provide, these
risks include not only objective measures of the project’s physical
effect on the land, but also potential cultural and health risks. 150
Sarayaku reiterated that the state must actively provide relevant
information to affected communities and maintain constant
communication throughout the project’s life cycle. 151 Only through
such measures can a state verify that the indigenous group can make
decisions regarding the project “knowingly and voluntarily.” 152
In Sarayaku, the Court held that CGC’s “socialization” of the
Kichwa did not constitute an informed consultation process. 153 The
Court observed that there was no evidence that CGC’s actions served
to educate locals about the advantages and disadvantages of the oil
exploration on their way of life. 154 Also, because a state cannot
delegate its consultation duty to third parties, CGC’s failure to
adequately inform amounted to a violation by Ecuador of its FPIC
supervising third-party or public sector measures, deploying “effective means to
safeguard those rights through the corresponding judicial organs”).
150. See Saramaka, supra note 6, ¶ 133 (affirming that Suriname should have
given the Saramakas early notice of all of the potential risks associated with the
planned development, including environmental and health risks, “in order that the
proposed development or investment plan is accepted knowingly and voluntarily”);
Sarayaku, supra note 2, ¶ 205 (citing Saramaka and thereby affirming the criteria
set).
151. See Sarayaku, supra note 1, ¶ 208 (holding that the duty of constant
communication requires states to both receive and provide information).
152. Id. ¶ 205.
153. Id. ¶ 209 (stating that the “socialization” process did not include an
environmental impact assessment, allow for active participation, or inform the
Kichwa about the benefits and drawbacks of the project).
154. See id. (asserting that CGC had not thoroughly presented the findings of its
EIA to the community).
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obligations.
Likewise, the Brazilian state has not taken effective measures to
ensure that the Xingu communities are fully aware of Belo Monte’s
possible impacts. Foremost, in 2009, the state made its very
technical, 20,000-page EIA publicly available only two days before
holding public meetings. 155 This made it virtually impossible for
attendees to become properly acquainted with the highly complex
project before engaging in the dialogues. Furthermore, these
meetings were held in urban areas difficult to access by the affected
communities, who reside in more remote locations. 156 Indigenous
groups were dissuaded from attending given the costs and
inconvenience of travel and thus were unable to access information
essential to their understanding of Belo Monte. Finally, reports of
mediocre and biased translators shed doubt on the ability of Norte
Energia to effectively communicate with the meetings’ participants
and convey information to them in a neutral, non-coercive manner. 157
Accordingly, under Sarayaku, Brazil has not adequately complied
with the crucial information component of its FPIC duty.

C. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BELO MONTE DAM VIOLATES THE
BRAZILIAN CONSTITUTION
Just as Ecuador violated its own constitution by authorizing and
assisting CGC’s activities, 158 Brazil’s endorsement of Belo Monte
violates several Brazilian constitutional provisions. Foremost, the
hydroelectric project fails to meet Article 231’s exception to the bar
155. See Anaya 2010 Report, supra note 9, at 32 (noting that the lengthy study
comprised 36 different volumes).
156. See id. (noting that the talks were held in urban areas, even though the dam
will not directly affect urban dwellers).
157. See, e.g., After 21 Days, supra note 28 (reporting that the Xikrin only
consented to withdrawing from an inter-community protest of the dam after
participating in a series of “confusing and poorly translated” sessions with Norte
Energia’s president). The Xikrin are known to have a very small grasp of the
Portuguese language given their limited contact with nationalist society, which
allowed Norte Energia representatives to easily influence the dialogues by using
biased translators. Id.
158. See Sarayaku, supra note 1, ¶ 168 (noting that the Article 57
“comprehensively” protects the rights of indigenous peoples, including by
affording them the right to free, prior, and informed consultation on development
activities which could potentially have an environmental or cultural impact on
them).
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against removing indigenous peoples from their lands. 159 The
catastrophic event and national sovereignty exceptions authorize
only the temporary removal of affected populations. 160 Belo Monte’s
development, however, will cause irreversible environmental
damage that will render human habitation in large stretches of the
Xingu Basin virtually “impossible.” 161
For example, scientists expect the dam’s development to leave
formerly fertile sections of the Xingu Basin in perpetual drought,
threatening food and water security for indigenous groups living in
the area. 162 The dam’s effects on the flow of the Xingu will also lead
to the deterioration of water quality and the growth of aquatic plants
harmful to humans and the fish they consume. 163 Thus, even areas of
the basin that are not flooded will experience stresses that will render
them unfit for human habitation for an indeterminate period of time.
While Brazil has not explicitly ordered the removal of any
indigenous groups, 164 the dam’s adverse effects on indigenous lands
and livelihoods nonetheless will likely cause populations to relocate
159. See BRAZILIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 96, art. 231 (forbidding the
removal of Indians from their lands “except ad referendum of the National
Congress, in case of a catastrophe or an epidemic which represents a risk to their
population, or in the interest of the sovereignty of the country”).
160. See id. (declaring the state’s return of displaced peoples to their land “shall
be immediate as soon as the risk ceases”).
161. Juruna-Arara Action, supra note 44, at 6–8 (stating that the areas of the Big
Bend currently occupied by the Juruna and Arara will not be able to sustain the
populations once Belo Monte is built due to the projected environmental stresses of
the dam); see also RIMA, supra note 36, at 16, 111–14 (describing how the Belo
Monte’s mandatory inundation of over 500 square kilometers of the basin will
permanently alter vast stretches of land, flooding some areas while drying out
others).
162. See, e.g., 10 Myths, supra note 38 (postulating that the dam will lead to
“immeasurable environmental harm”).
163. See RIMA, supra note 36, at 116–17 (noting that the rotting of inundated
vegetation following the formation of reservoirs may contribute to the proliferation
of harmful plant life).
164. Compare FAQS, supra note 15, at 5 (asserting that dam operations will not
flood any of the indigenous communities falling within the project area) and
Phillips, supra note 11 (quoting Carlos Minc, Brazil’s environment minister, as
claiming that “[n]ot a single Indian will be displaced,” while conceding that some
indigenous communities will be “indirectly affected”), with 10 Myths, supra note
38 (explaining that the state considers only areas which will be flooded by dams as
being directly affected, but even so-called “indirect” impacts, such as loss of river
access and decimation of faunal species, will “undoubtedly” displace indigenous
populations from their traditional lands).
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to more habitable areas. 165 Because Article 231 does not expressly
define “removal” as an active measure, Brazil’s authorization of a
project very likely to displace several indigenous groups is still
unconstitutional as a passive act of removal. 166
Moreover, Belo Monte’s direct and indirect displacement of entire
populations fails to satisfy Article 231’s national sovereignty
exception to the bar against forcible removal. 167 As discussed, the
phrase, “in the interest of the sovereignty of the country,” must be
interpreted narrowly to prevent deliberate and opportunistic
manipulation of the constitutional text.168 Accordingly, only critical
situations of national security would justify Brazil’s temporary
violation of indigenous land rights. 169 In contrast, the major costs and
inefficiencies associated with Belo Monte shed doubt on Brazil’s
claim that the dam is crucial for the country’s development. 170
Therefore, the national sovereignty exception does not apply.
Additionally, Brazil’s authorization of Belo Monte violates Article
165. See, e.g., E.L. LA ROVERE & F.E. MENDES, WORLD COMMISSION ON DAMS,
TUCURUÍ HYDROPOWER COMPLEX BRAZIL xv (2000) (describing how an outbreak
of Mansonia mosquitoes following the construction of the Tucuruí Hydropower
Complex created such a public health risk and general nuisance that some residents
were forced to abandon daily farming activities and eventually relocate to
unaffected areas); see also Jampolsky, supra note 8, at 245 (stating that between
20,000 and 40,000 people will be displaced by large-scale flooding, degradation of
fisheries, loss of river access, and other impacts).
166. BRAZILIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 96, art. 231 (providing that the
displacement of indigenous populations in general is lawful pursuant only to
limited exceptions, none of which condone passive removal).
167. Id. (permitting removal pursuant to sovereignty interests).
168. Juruna-Arara Action, supra note 44, at 16.
169. See, e.g., id. (offering the example of the state removing an indigenous
population during wartime to facilitate the movement of troops). According to
scholar dos Anjos Filho, in such an event, the national security interests of Brazil
would arguably outweigh any temporary inconveniences the state may impose on
the population by relocating it until the threat has passed. Id.
170. See, e.g., Wilson Cabral de Sousa Júnior & John Reid, Uncertainties in
Amazon Hydropower Development: Risk Scenarios and Environmental Issues
around the Belo Monte Dam, in 3 WATER ALTERNATIVES 249, 258 (2010)
(assessing the environmental impacts of the dam to calculate the project’s total
costs, which the study concludes are seventy-two percent likely to outweigh the
benefits); see also 10 Myths, supra note 38 (arguing that while the state claims that
Belo Monte is essential to meeting the country’s energy needs, as much as thirty
percent of the hydropower generated will actually go to inefficient industrial
operations, such as mining).
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231’s legislative requirement. Even if the dam’s development does in
fact constitute a “relevant public interest of the Union,” the state’s
infringement on indigenous property rights pursuant to this interest is
only valid with the passage of a supplementary law. 171 According to
public prosecutors and multiple court decisions, the National
Congress’s vote in favor of Belo Monte and enactment of Legislative
Decree 788/2005 was invalid and thus does not satisfy this
requirement. 172
In Sarayaku, the Court cited Ecuador’s constitution to demonstrate
that the state fully recognized the right of indigenous peoples to
consultation, even in its own state laws. 173 Specifically, the Court
referred to Article 57, which provides that Ecuador must carry out
“free, prior, and informed consultation” with indigenous peoples on
any project that may have an environmental or cultural impact on
them. 174 While the Brazilian constitution does not contain as express
a provision on the right to consultation, 175 it does recognize that
international treaties to which Brazil is a party provide

171. BRAZILIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 96, art. 231 (“Acts with a view to
occupation, domain and possession of [Indian] lands . . . are null and void,
producing no legal effects, except in case of relevant public interest of the Union,
as provided by a supplementary law . . . .”).
172. See, e.g., Court Halts Belo Monte Project, supra note 19 (reporting Judge
Prudente as affirming that Congress can only authorize development that may
affect indigenous lands and rights after consulting the relevant communities, but
the National Congress held its legislative vote concerning Belo Monte’s
authorization before ensuring any consultations with the Xingu Basin’s indigenous
peoples were carried out).
173. See Sarayaku, supra note 1, ¶ 168 (observing that Ecuador’s 2008
constitution “comprehensively” protects indigenous peoples, and that James
Anaya, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, even
called the Constitution one of the most “advanced” and “exemplary” in terms of
recognizing indigenous rights).
174. Id. at 46 n.219 (citing Article 57 of the 2008 Constitution, which holds if
the state is unable to obtain the consent of the consulted people on the proposed
measure, it must then refer to the steps provided for by the Constitution and the
law to determine its next plan of action).
175. But see BRAZILIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 96, art. 231 (stipulating that
the state may allow the exploitation of hydric resources and “mineral riches”
located in indigenous land only after receiving congressional authorization and
“hearing the communities involved”). While this provision seems to imply that the
state must hold some form of prior consultation with the indigenous peoples whose
lands are to be exploited, there is no explicit consent requirement. Id.
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supplementary protections enforceable under domestic law. 176
Thus, because Brazil has failed to satisfy any of the constitutional
criteria that would validate Belo Monte’s infringement on indigenous
rights, it is bound to uphold the additional rights recognized by the
ACHR and ILO Convention 169. These protections, the rights to
consultation and FPIC, attach to the indigenous property and cultural
rights already recognized in Article 231 of the constitution.
Accordingly, Brazil, like Ecuador, has violated its own laws by
endorsing a project without first consulting the affected indigenous
groups and securing their free, prior, and informed consent.

D. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BELO MONTE DAM VIOLATES ILO
CONVENTION 169
Brazil’s authorization of Belo Monte violates ILO Convention
169’s consultation and FPIC provisions, 177 thereby undermining
Brazil’s internalization of the treaty. 178 By the time CGC unlawfully
entered Kichwa land, ILO Convention 169 had already entered into
force in Ecuador and codified an internationally agreed-upon set of
protections to indigenous peoples. 179 Brazil’s congressional approval
of Belo Monte likewise occurred one year after a presidential decree
officially incorporated the treaty into Brazilian law. 180 Like Ecuador,
176. Id. art. 5 (LXXVII) (declaring that rights holders may derive additional
protections that the Constitution does not expressly provide from international
treaties to which Brazil is a party).
177. See generally ILO Convention 169, supra note 5, arts. 6–8 (affording
indigenous peoples the rights to consultation and to free, prior, and informed
consent on matters affecting their social, economic, and cultural development).
178. See Press Release, Amazon Watch, ILO Says Brazil Violated Convention
169
in
Belo
Monte
Case
(Mar.
7,
2012),
available
at
http://amazonwatch.org/news/2012/0307-ilo-says-brazil-violated-convention-169in-belo-monte-case (summarizing an ILO report claiming that Brazil had violated
Article 15 of ILO Convention 169 by failing to hold hearings in the villages of the
indigenous groups affected by Belo Monte’s development).
179. See Sarayaku, supra note 1, ¶ 172 (asserting that Ecuador assumed an
international commitment to guarantee its indigenous peoples the right to
consultation upon ratifying ILO Convention 169 in 1998).
180. Compare Decreto No. 5.051, supra note 101 (promulgating ILO
Convention 169 in 2004, thereby officially incorporating the treaty’s provisions
into domestic law), with Decreto Legislativo No. 788, Diário Oficial da União
(Braz.) (July 13, 2005) (authorizing the Executive to implement the Belo Monte
Dam’s development in 2005, one year after Brazil’s presidential enactment of ILO
Convention 169).
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Brazil ratified the Convention without modifying the original text or
conditioning its provisions, despite the availability of a flexibility
clause. 181 Accordingly, as in the case of Ecuador, Brazil’s violation
of ILO Convention 169 directly breaches both domestic and
international law.
By permitting construction on Belo Monte to commence without
first attempting to secure the willful and informed consent of affected
indigenous groups, Brazil violated the plain language of ILO
Convention 169. Article 6 requires that states undertake
consultations “in good faith and in a form appropriate to the
circumstances,” with the goal of achieving consent or agreement on
the proposed measures. 182 As argued, both Ecuador and Brazil have
failed to meet the good faith criterion due to their acquiescence to
third parties’ inherently coercive measures during so-called
consultations. CGC, for example, obtained signatures of support for
its seismic activities under false pretenses. 183 Comparably, Norte
Energia allowed translators to distort the messages indigenous
community members had them relay to the company’s president. 184
Moreover, like Ecuador, Brazil has demonstrated a lack of a good
faith commitment to reaching a consensus with the Xingu Basin’s
indigenous groups. Indeed, the limited dialogues that the state and
Norte Energia held with some of the affected communities did not
offer conditions conducive to cooperation and mutual exchange. In a
recent meeting, members of the Juruna and Arara communities
became so dissatisfied with Norte Energia’s persistent evasion of
their demands that they detained three company employees in
protest. 185 Norte Energia’s public meetings have also included
181. See Decreto Legislativo No. 143, supra note 104 (approving the text of the
Convention without proposing any modifications or conditions).
182. ILO Convention 169, supra note 5, art. 6.
183. See Sarayaku, supra note 1, ¶ 194 (presenting the Commission’s
undisputed allegations that CGC employees fraudulently obtained the signatures
by instructing individuals to sign a list to indicate their interest in the CGC’s offer
to send free medical teams to their communities).
184. See After 21 Days, supra note 28 (arguing that the Xikrin were especially
vulnerable given their limited Portuguese skills).
185. See Broken Promises, supra note 32 (explaining that the Juruna and Arara
communities who carried out the non-violent detention were frustrated by Norte
Energia’s failure to present practical proposals for mitigating the dam’s imminent
social and environmental impacts on their communities and lands).
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attempts to buy the attendees’ complacence in order to avoid
addressing indigenous demands. For example, during talks in July
2012, the consortium offered communities various perks while
refusing to set a timetable for meeting legally mandated
environmental and social conditions. 186 Comparably, CGC tried to
buy members of the Sarayaku community’s consent by offering
bribes and paying individuals to rally support for its unlawful
presence on Kichwa lands.
Additionally, by failing to consult the Xingu Basin’s indigenous
peoples during the planning and evaluation phases of Belo Monte’s
development, Brazil violated Article 7 of Convention 169. Article 7
requires states to ensure that studies assessing the social, spiritual,
cultural, and environmental impact of planned development projects
are carried out “in cooperation with the peoples concerned.” 187 In
Sarayaku, the Court found Ecuador in breach of its Article 7 duty by
failing to ensure the Sarayaku people’s participation in the study
CGC subcontracted a private agency to carry out. 188
Similarly, not only did Eletrobras conduct its EIA for Belo Monte
without engaging local indigenous groups, but it also failed to
adequately communicate its findings to affected communities after
the fact. 189 Thus, groups like the Juruna and the Arara, who experts
claim will face significant hardships as a result of the dam’s
development, have had no influence over any stages of the planning
process—neither those preceding the EIA nor those following its
completion. Indeed, as Brazilian courts have indicated, the
186. See Diamond & Poirier, supra note 39, at 29 (stating that some of the
“compensation” packages Norte Energia offered simply included social services
the constitution already guarantees to indigenous peoples, but the consortium and
the media were able to treat these services as handouts because of lack of
information on part of the communities, many of which have very limited contact
with nationalist society).
187. ILO Convention 169, supra note 5, art. 7 (stipulating that during the
consultation processes surrounding a development scheme, states should refer to
the findings of impact studies as “fundamental criteria” for implementing the
proposed project).
188. See Sarayaku, supra note 1, ¶ 207.
189. See, e.g., Anaya 2010 Report, supra note 9, at 32 (observing that the
official EIA for Belo Monte, which consisted of 36 volumes and 20,000 pages, was
not publicly available until two days before Norte Energia’s public audiences,
making it virtually impossible for communities to become familiar with the highly
technical scheme before attending the meetings).
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government did not even consult the affected indigenous peoples
before authorizing a legislative vote on the dam. 190 This is in direct
breach of the ILO’s requirement that states involve affected
indigenous groups “in the [decision-making] process as soon as
possible” and at all phases of the process of drafting legislation. 191

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. BRAZIL SHOULD SUSPEND WORK ON BELO MONTE UNTIL IT
RECEIVES THE AFFECTED INDIGENOUS COMMUNITIES’ CONSENT
FOLLOWING GOOD-FAITH CONSULTATIONS CONFORMING TO THE
SARAYAKU STANDARD
Although Sarayaku formally binds only on Ecuador, 192 Brazil
should nonetheless conform to the standard set and suspend Belo
Monte’s development until it fulfills its consultation and FPIC duties.
The Xingu communities already filed a complaint against Brazil
before the IACHR and a case before the Court is likely imminent. 193
Given the strong factual and legal parallels between the Sarayaku
and Belo Monte disputes, it is highly likely that the Court would find
Brazil also in violation of international and domestic law for its acts
and omissions surrounding Belo Monte. 194 Both parties, the Brazilian
government and the Xingu communities, could thus benefit greatly
by avoiding the costs and inconveniences of litigation by reaching a
balanced agreement conforming to Sarayaku’s FPIC standard, before
190. See Court Halts Belo Monte Project, supra note 19 (explaining that one of
Judge Prudente’s reasons for halting Belo Monte’s construction was because the
government had yet to fulfill this legally-mandated condition).
191. Sarayaku, supra note 1, ¶ 181; see also Report of the Committee
Established to Examine the Claim Alleging Non-Compliance by Colombia of the
Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, 1989 (No. 169), filed under Article
24 of the ILO Constitution by the Central Unitaria de Trabajadores, GB.276/17/1;
GB.282/14/3 (1999), ¶ 90 (responding to a complaint alleging Colombia’s noncompliance with Convention 169).
192. See ACHR, supra note 4, art. 68 (providing that states shall comply with
the judgment of the Court “in any case to which they are parties”).
193. See Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Indigenous Communities of the Xingu River
Basin, Pará, Brazil, PM 382/10, Apr. 1, 2011 (precautionary measures) (finding
for the Xingu communities and recommending that Brazil halt Belo Monte’s
construction until it fulfills its consultation and FPIC obligations).
194. See supra Part III (demonstrating that Brazil and Ecuador violated parallel
as well as the same legal instruments through their acts and omissions surrounding
Belo Monte and CGC’s exploration activities, respectively).
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a lawsuit is necessary.

B. THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM SHOULD FURTHER EXTEND THE
RIGHTS TO CONSULTATION AND FPIC BY REQUIRING THE
PRESENCE OF NEUTRAL THIRD-PARTY MEDIATORS DURING STATE
CONSULTATIONS
As Ecuador and Brazil have both demonstrated, states cannot
always be trusted to act in the interest of groups theoretically under
their protection, particularly when economic interests are involved.
In the case of Belo Monte, for instance, the Brazilian state has been
the driving force behind the dam’s development, allowing the project
to survive several challenges to its legitimacy and to circumvent
domestic and international law. 195 Likewise, Ecuador permitted
CGC’s presence on Kichwa land despite its awareness of the
company’s unlawful conduct. 196
By requiring a neutral third party to monitor and mediate
consultations, the OAS can ensure that a state’s biased interests do
not prevent indigenous peoples affected by government-sponsored
development from realizing their rights. The IACHR’s Special
Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Populations could potentially
serve as a mediator, using his or her observations of the consultations
to assist the Court in determining the state’s liability in the event of
litigation. 197
Conversely,
the
Rapporteur
could
offer
recommendations directly to the state during the course of the
consultations themselves, helping affected parties avoid litigation.
Whether such recommendations could be immediately binding
would be for the Inter-American system’s legal organs and OAS
states to decide.

195. See Background, supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the various procedural
illegalities Brazil tolerated in order to facilitate Belo Monte’s authorization).
196. See, e.g., Sarayaku, supra note 1, ¶ 134 (noting that Ecuador was “fully
aware” that CGC was obstructing the Sarayaku Kichwa’s freedom of movement
and other guaranteed rights).
197. Such a task would be consistent with the Rapporteur’s mandate to “support
onsite visits to OAS member countries in order to delve more deeply into the
observation of the general situation or to investigate particular situations involving
indigenous peoples . . . .” Mandate, OAS, http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/indigenous/
mandate/Functions.asp (last visited July 26, 2013).
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C. ILO CONVENTION 169 SHOULD BE REVISED TO ENDORSE THE
SARAYAKU STANDARD
Sarayaku sets a higher standard for the right to free, prior, and
informed consent than ILO Convention 169 and other existing
international documents concerning indigenous rights. 198 For
instance, whereas Article 6 of the convention merely states that
consultations must be undertaken “in good faith and in a form
appropriate to the circumstances,” 199 Sarayaku clearly articulates that
“good faith” requires the absence of any coercive measures,
including actions targeted at breaking the social cohesion of the
community in question. 200 Furthermore, while the convention is
silent on whether a state may transfer its consultation duties to a third
party, Sarayaku explicitly holds that the duty to consult is entirely a
state responsibility. Thus, a state cannot avoid properly planning and
carrying out good faith, culturally appropriate dialogues by
delegating the task to a non-state third party. 201
Because several non-OAS states have ratified ILO Convention
169, revising the agreement to include these new, more stringent
standards could result in increased indigenous rights protection in a
greater geographic area than solely states falling within the InterAmerican system’s jurisdiction. 202 Repeated evocation of the norms
198. See, e.g., UNDRIP, supra note 49, art. 19 (providing that states must carry
out consultations in “good faith,” but failing to qualify what exactly constitutes a
good faith dialogue).
199. ILO Convention 169, supra note 5, art. 6.
200. Sarayaku, supra note 1, ¶ 186 (proclaiming that consultations should be
conducted in a “climate of mutual trust” and that “good faith” is incompatible with
attempts to break the social cohesion of communities, which contradicts
international standards calling for collective decision-making).
201. See id. ¶ 187 (emphasizing that it is counterintuitive for a state to delegate
its consultation duties to the very party interested in developing the land at
dispute).
202. Denmark, Nepal, Spain, Norway, the Netherlands, and the Central African
Republic all have ratified the Convention. While neither Spain nor the Netherlands
have indigenous peoples traditionally residing within their territories, the
Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations
(“CEACR”) has expressed its support of Spain’s ratification of ILO Convention
169 and its belief that such ratifications could “contribute positively towards the
ratification of the Convention by other countries, even those that do not have
indigenous and tribal peoples.” Direct Request (CEACR), adopted 2010, 100th
Session, available at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:
13100:P13100_COMMENT_ID,P11110_COUNTRY_ID,P11110_COUNTRY_N
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enshrined in Sarayaku could lead to their eventual standardization
and universal acceptance. While stricter than ILO Convention 169’s
current consultation requirements, the Sarayaku standard would not
necessarily impose a greater burden on parties to the convention if
adopted into a revised version. Therefore, the risk that current parties
will decline to become signatories to a slightly modified Convention
is likely minimal. 203

V. CONCLUSION
Given the strong factual and legal parallels between the Belo
Monte and Sarayaku disputes, the Sarayaku holding has the potential
to delegitimize the Belo Monte Dam. Through its acts and omissions
supporting the project, Brazil has breached the same international
legal standards that the Inter-American Court held Ecuador had
violated by authorizing CGC’s presence and unlawful activities on
Kichwa land. The Inter-American system should therefore apply
Sarayaku’s new consultation and FPIC standard to denounce Belo
Monte’s development, formally via court decision or through other
advisory mechanisms, thereby ordering Brazil to halt construction
until it complies with the standard’s numerous safeguards.

AME,P11110_COMMENT_YEAR:2337401,102847,Spain,2010 (expressing the
CEACR’s);
see
also
Survival
International,
ILO
169,
http://assets.survivalinternational.org/static/files/tribes/bulletin_ilo169.pdf
(last
visited July 26, 2013) (implying that ratification commits states to “basic
consultation requirements” even for the development projects it funds outside of its
national territory).
203. See ILO Convention 169, supra note 5, art. 43 (stipulating that in the event
of revision, a party state’s ratification of the revised Convention shall involve the
“immediate denunciation” of the agreement in its preceding form).

